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Abstract
We theoretically analyse the limits of robustness to test-time adversarial and noisy
examples in classification. Our work focuses on deriving bounds which uniformly
apply to all classifiers (i.e all measurable functions from features to labels) for a
given problem. Our contributions are three-fold. (1) In the classical framework of
adversarial attacks, we use optimal transport theory to derive variational formulae
for the Bayes-optimal error a classifier can make on a given classification problem,
subject to adversarial attacks. We also propose a simple algorithm for computing
the corresponding universal (i.e classifier-independent) adversarial attacks, based
on maximal matching on bipartite graphs. (2) We derive explicit lower-bounds on
the Bayes-optimal error in the case of the popular distance-based attacks. These
bounds are universal in the sense that they depend on the geometry of the class-
conditional distributions of the data, but not on a particular classifier. This is in
contrast with the existing literature, wherein adversarial vulnerability of classifiers
is derived as a consequence of nonzero ordinary test error. (3) For our third
contribution, we study robustness to random noise corruption, wherein the attacker
(or nature) is allowed to inject random noise into examples at test time. We establish
nonlinear data-processing inequalities induced by such corruptions, and use them
to obtain lower-bounds on the Bayes-optimal error.
1 Introduction
Despite their popularization, machine-learning powered systems (AI-assisted driving, natural lan-
guage processing, facial recognition, etc.) are not likely to be deployed for critical tasks which require
a stringent error margin, in a closed-loop regime any time soon. One of the main blockers which has
been identified by practitioners and ML researchers alike is the phenomenon of adversarial exam-
ples [Szegedy et al., 2013]. There is an arms race [Athalye et al., 2018] between adversarial attack
developers and defenders, and there is some speculation that adversarial examples in machine-learning
might simply be inevitable.
In a nutshell an (evasion) attack operates as follows. A classifier is trained and deployed (e.g the
road traffic sign recognition sub-system on an AI-assisted car). At test / inference time, an attacker
may submit queries to the classifier by sampling a data point x with true label y, and modifying it
x → xadv according to a prescribed threat model. For example, modifying a few pixels on a road
traffic sign [Su et al., 2017], modifying intensity of pixels by a limited amount determined by a
prescribed tolerance level variance per pixel, etc. The goal of the attacker is to fool the classifier into
classifying xadv with a label different from y. A robust classifier tries to limit this failure mode, for a
prescribed attack model.
In this manuscript, we establish universal lower-bounds on the test error any classifier can attain
under test-time adversarial attacks and corruption by random noise, on a given classification problem.
1.1 Overview of related works
Questions around adversarial examples and fundamental limits of defense mechanisms, are an active
area of research in machine-learning, with a large body of scientific literature. Let us overview a
representative sample of this literature which is relevant to our own contributions.
Classifier-dependent bounds. There is a rich array of works which study adversarial exam-
ples as a consequence of nonzero ordinary / non-adversarial test error [Szegedy et al., 2013,
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Tsipras et al., 2018, Schmidt et al., 2018, Shafahi et al., 2018, Gilmer et al., 2018, Dohmatob, 2019,
Fawzi et al., 2018, Mahloujifar et al., 2018]. These all use a form of the Gaussian isoperimetric
inequality [Boucheron et al., 2013]: in these theories, adversarial examples exist as a consequence of
ordinary test-error in high-dimensional problems with concentrated class-conditional distributions.
On such problems, for a classifier which does not attain 100% on clean test examples (which is likely
to be the case in practice), every test example will be close to a misclassified example, i.e can be
misclassified by adding a small perturbation. Still using Gaussian isoperimetry, [Gilmer et al., 2019]
has studied the relationship between robustness to adversaries and robustness to random noise. The
authors argued that adversarial examples are a natural consequence of errors made by a classifier on
noisy images. In section 5, we will extend this line of thought and obtain universal bounds in this
scenario.
One should also mention some works which exploit curvature of the decision boundary of neu-
ral networks to exhibit the existence of vectors in low-dimensional subspaces, which when
added to every example in a target class, can fool a classifier on a fraction of the sam-
ples [Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2017, Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2017].
Universal / classifier-independent bounds. To our knowledge, [Bhagoji et al., 2019] is the first
work to derive universal / classifier-independent lower-bounds for adversarial robustness. The authors
considered general adversarial attacks (i.e beyond distance-based models of attack), and show that
Bayes-optimal error for the resulting classification problem under such adversaries is linked to a
certain transport distance between the class-conditional distributions (see our Theorem 3.1 for a
generalization of the result). This result is singularly different from the previous literature as it applies
even to classifiers which have zero test-error in the normal / non-adversarial sense. Thus, there
adversarial examples that exist solely as a consequence of the geometry of the problem. The results
in section 3 of our paper are strict extension of the bounds in [Bhagoji et al., 2019]. The recent work
[Cranko et al., 2019] which studies the vulnerability of hypothesis classes in connection with loss
functions used, also falls into this line of research.
1.2 Summary of our main contributions
Our main contributions can be summarized as follows.
• Adversarial attacks. In section 3 (after developing some background material in section 2), we
use optimal transport theory to derive various lower-bound on the Bayes-optimal error (aka smallest
possible test error) of a classifier under adversarial attack, as a function of the "budget" of the attacker,
1. See Thm. 3.2 and its corollaries. These bounds suggest that instead of doing adversarial training,
practitioners should rather do normal training on adversarially augmented data. Incidentally, this is a
well-known trick to boost up the adversarial robustness of classifiers to known attacks, and is usually
used in practice under the umbrella name of "adversarial data-augmentation". In this manuscript, it
appears as a natural consequence of our theoretical results. We also provide a realistic algorithm for
computing the optimal universal attack plan via maximal matching of bipartite graphs. See section
3.3. Then in section 4, we proceed to (1) Establish universal bounds assuming the class-conditional
distributions are light-tailed (e.g multivariate Gaussians, etc.). (2) Establish universal bounds under
more general moment constraints conditions on the class-conditional distributions.
• Random corruption. Section 5 considers robustness to the corruption by random noise, in which
the attacker (or nature!) corrupts each example at test-time by adding an instance of noise drawn
from the same underlying distribution (e.g Gaussian noise). This scenario captures noise which might
be inherent in measurement instruments, say. The "budget" parameter here is typically the variance
of the noise. For the analysis, we borrow and extend certain tools from information theory (more
precisely, strong nonlinear data-processing inequalities), to give exact bounds on the Bayes-optimal
error against such adversaries. Our main result in this scenario are Thm. 5.2 and its corollaries.
2 Preliminaries
All through this manuscript, the feature space will be denoted X . The label (aka classification target)
is a random variable Y with values in Y = {1, 2}, and random variable X called the features, with
1This can be say, the size ε of the perturbations, measured in some norm.
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values in X . We only consider binary classification problems in this work. The goal is to predict Y
given X . This corresponds to prescribing a measurable function h : X → {1, 2}, called a classifier.
Let P be the (unknown) joint probability distribution of (X,Y ). The goal of learning is to find a
classifier h, such that h(X) = Y as often as possible, possibly under additional constraints.
General framework. In this work, as in [Bhagoji et al., 2019], we will only consider bi-
nary classification problems under adversarial attacks, where the labels are equiprobably , i.e
P(Y = 1) = P(Y = 2) = 1/2. Multiclass problems can be considered in one-versus-all
fashion. We will denote P k := 12P(X|Y = k) for k = 1, 2, so that the classification prob-
lem is entirely captured by the pair P = (P 1, P 2), called a classification problem or binary
experiment [Reid and Williamson, 2011].
2.1 Models of adversarial attack
In full generality, an adversarial attack model on the feature space X (a topological space) is a closed
subset Ω ⊆ X 2. Given x′, x ∈ X , we call x′ a adversarial example of x if (x, x′) ∈ Ω. The case
Ω = diag(X 2) := {(x, x) | x ∈ X} corresponds to classical / standard classification theory where
there is no adversary. A nontrivial example is the case of so-called distance-based attacks, where
X = (X , d) and attack model Ωε is given by
Ωε = {(x, x′) ∈ X 2 | d(x, x′) ≤ ε}, (1)
with ε ≥ 0 being the budget of the attacker. These include the well-known `p-norm attacks in
finite-dimensional euclidean spaces usually studied in the literature (e.g [Szegedy et al., 2013,
Tsipras et al., 2018, Schmidt et al., 2018, Shafahi et al., 2018, Gilmer et al., 2018]). Another in-
stance of our Ω-formulation is when Ω = ΩA := {(x, x′) ∈ X 2 | Ax ∩ Ax′ 6= ∅}, for a system
(Ax)x∈X of subsets of X . This framework is already much more general than the distance-based
framework (which is the default setting in the literature), and corresponds to the setting considered
in [Bhagoji et al., 2019]. Working at this level of generallity allows the possibility to study general
attacks like pixel-erasure attacks [Su et al., 2017], for example, which cannot be metrically expressed.
X
X
2ε
Figure 1: Showing a generic
distance-based attack model. The
green region corresponds to the set
Ωε defined in (1). An attacker is
allowed to swap any point x ∈ X
with another point x′ ∈ X , as long
as (x, x′) lies in the green region.
A type−Ω adversarial attacker on the feature space X is then
a measurable mapping a : X → X , such that (x, a(x)) ∈ Ω
for all x ∈ X . For example, in the distance-based attacks, it
corresponds to a measurable selection for every x ∈ X , of some
x′ = a(x) ∈ X with d(x, x′) ≤ ε.
Definition 2.1 (Adversarial test error). The test error (aka error,
aka risk) of a classifier h : X → {1, 2}, subject to type-Ω at-
tacks, is defined by RΩ(h;P ) := P(x,y)∼P [∃x′ ∈ X , (x, x′) ∈
Ω s.t h(x′) 6= y]. This is the least possible classification error
suffered by h under type-Ω attacks. The Bayes-optimal (test)
error R∗Ω(P 1, P 2) for type-Ω attacks is defined by
R∗Ω(P
1, P 2) := inf
h
RΩ(h;P
1, P 2), (2)
where the infimum is taken over all measurable functions h :
X → {1, 2}, i.e over all classifiers. For distance-based attacks
with budget ε (with the attack model as defined in Eq. (1)), we
will simply write R∗ε(P
1, P 2) in lieu of RΩε(P
1, P 2), that is
R∗ε(P
1, P 2) := R∗Ωε(P
1, P 2) := inf
h
P(x,y)∼P [∃x′ ∈ X , d(x, x′) ≤ ε | h(x′) 6= y]. (3)
Econometrically, R∗Ω(P
1, P 2) corresponds to the maximal payoff of a type-Ω adversarial attacker
who tries to uniformly “blunt” all classifiers at the task of solving the classification problem (P 1, P 2).
3
3 Universal bounds for adversarial attacks
3.1 Adversarial attacks as optimal transport plans
Consider the binary transportation cost-function cΩ : X 2 → {0, 1}, defined by
cΩ(x, x
′) :=
{
0, if (x, x′) ∈ Ω,
1, else.
(4)
This cost function is special in that, for every (x, x′) ∈ Ω, one can transport x to x′ without incurring
any cost at all. If x and x′ happen to belong to different classes, then an adversarial attack which
replaces x with x′ will be perfectly undetectable. As in [Bhagoji et al., 2019], we start with a
variational formula for measuring the cost of a type-Ω for the task of “blunting” the Bayes-optimal
classifier for the classification problem (P 1, P 2).
Definition 3.1 (Adversarial total-variation). Let OTΩ(P 1, P 2) be the optimal transport distance
between P 1 and P 2 w.r.t to the ground cost cΩ defined in Eq. (4), i.e
OTΩ(P
1, P 2) := inf
γ∈Π(P 1,P 2)
∫
X 2
cΩ(x1, x2) dγ(x1, x2) = inf
γ∈Π(P 1,P 2)
Eγ [cΩ(X1, X2)], (5)
where Π(P 1, P 2) is the set of all couplings of P 1 and P 2, i.e the set of all measures on X 2 with
marginals P 1 and P 2, and (X1, X2) is a pair of r.vs on X with joint distribution γ.
If γ is a coupling of P 1 and P 2 and (X1, X2) ∼ γ, with abuse of language we shall also refer to
(X1, X2) as a coupling of P 1 and P 2.
Note that, since Ω ⊆ X 2 is closed, cΩ is lower-semicontinuous (l.s.c) and is therefore an admissible
ground cost-function for transportation between distributions onX . Thus, OTΩ(·, ·) defines a distance
over measures on the feature space X .
Link to classical theory of classification. It is well-known [Reid and Williamson, 2011] in
standard classification theory that the Bayes-optimal error is exactly equal to
R∗(P 1, P 2) :=
1
2
(1− TV(P 1, P 2)), (6)
where TV(P 1, P 2) is the total-variation deistance between P 1 and P 2 defined by
TV(P 1, P 2) := sup
A⊆X measurable
P 1(A)− P 2(A) = inf
γ∈Π(P 1,P 2)
P(X1 6= X2), (7)
The RHS of the above formula is usually referred to as Strassen’s formula for total-variation.
For us, it also turns out to correspond to the adversarial total-variation OTdiag(X 2)(P 1, P 2),
defined in Eq. 5, for the trivial attack model Ω := diag(X 2) := {(x, x) | x ∈ X}, i.e when
there is no adversary. Allowing for arbitrary / nontrivial attack models generalizes this view to
the context of classification under adversarial attacks.
Proposition 3.1 (Extension of Theorem 1 of [Bhagoji et al., 2019]). For any attack model Ω on the
feature spaceX , the Bayes-optimal error under type-Ω attacks R∗Ω(P 1, P 2) ≥ 12 (1−OTΩ(P 1, P 2)).
Remark 3.1. The reverse inequality does not hold in general. A remarkable exception is the case of
distance-based attacks, under the additional condition that the distance d turns the feature space
X into a complete geodesic space. For example, this is the case if (X , d) is complete and has the
mid-point property (e.g as in normed vector spaces).
3.2 Variational formulae for OTΩ
Henceforth, assume the feature space X is Polish (i.e X is metrizable, complete, and separable).
Finally, given a subset U ⊆ X , define its Ω-closure UΩ by
UΩ := {x ∈ X | (x, x′) ∈ Ω for some x′ ∈ U}. (8)
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In the case of metric attacks where Ω = Ωε := {(x, x′) ∈ X 2 | d(x, x′) ≤ ε}, we have UΩ = Uε,
where Uε is the ε-neighborhood of U defined by
Uε := {x ∈ X | d(x, x′) ≤ ε for some x′ ∈ U}. (9)
The following theorem is a direct application of Strassen’s Marriage Theorem (see [Villani, 2003,
Theorem 1.27]), and is as a first simplification of the complicated distance OTΩ that appears in
Proposition 3.1.
Theorem 3.1. Let Ω be an attack model on X . Then we have the identity
OTΩ(P
1, P 2) = sup
U⊆X closed
P 1(U)− P 2(UΩ). (10)
In particular, for distance-based attacks we have OTΩε(P
1, P 2) = supU⊆X closed P
2(U)−P 1(Uε).
The next theorem is one of our main contributions. It allows us to rewrite the complicated optimal-
transport distance OTΩ(P 1, P 2) that appears in the lower-bound in Proposition 3.1 as the smallest
total-variation distance between adversarial deformations of the class-conditional distributions.
Theorem 3.2 (Bounds via adversarial total-variation). Let Ω be an attack model on the feature space
X . For k = 1, 2, let projk : X 2 → X be the canonical projection operators, i.e proj1(x1, x2) =
x1 = proj
2(x2, x1). Define the functionals
TVΩ(P
1, P 2) := inf
a1,a2 type-Ω
TV(a1#P
2, a2#P
1),
T˜VΩ(P
1, P 2) := inf
γ1,γ2
TV(proj2#γ1, proj
1
#γ2),
(11)
where "#" denotes pushfoward of measures and the 2nd infimum is taken over all pairs of distributions
(γ1, γ2) on X 2 which are concentrated on X 2 \Ω and verify proj1#γ1 = P 2, proj2#γ2 = P 1. Then,
OTΩ(P
1, P 2) = T˜VΩ(P
1, P 2) ≤ TVΩ(P 1, P 2), (12)
and there is equality if P 1 and P 2 have densities w.r.t the Lebesgue measure on X .
Consequently, we have the following lower-bound for the Bayes-optimal error against type-Ω attacks
R∗Ω(P
1, P 2) ≥ 1
2
(1− OTΩ(P 1, P 2)) = 1
2
(1− TVΩ(P 1, P 2)) ≥ 1
2
(1− T˜VΩ(P 1, P 2)). (13)
A constructive proof of the Thm. 3.2 is based on the so-called Disintegration Theorem [Villani, 2003],
and is provided in the supplemental. Theorem 3.2 has several important consequences, which will be
heavily explored in the sequel. A particularly simple consequence is the following.
Corollary 3.1. Let the feature space X be a normed vector space and consider a distance-limited
attack model Ωx = Ball(x; ε). Then, it holds that:
R∗Ω(P
1, P 2) ≥ 1
2
(
1− sup
z∈Ball(0;ε)
TV(P 1 − z, P 2 + z)
)
. (14)
A solution in z ∈ Ball(0; ε) to optimization problem in the RHS of (14) would be a (doubly) universal
adversarial perturbation: a single fixed small vector which fools all classifiers on proportion of test
samples. Such a phenomenon has been reported in [Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2017].
As a concrete application of Corollary 3.1, consider the following problem inspired by
[Tsipras et al., 2018] were the classification target is uniformly distributed on {1, 2} and the
class-conditional distribution of the features are multi-variate Gaussians with the same covari-
ance matrix for both classes. More formerly, the joint distribution of X and Y is given by
Y ∼ U({1, 2}), X|(Y = k) ∼ N (µk,Σ), where µ1, µ2 ∈ Rm and Σ is p.s.d matrix of size
d, with singular values σ1 ≥ . . . ≥ σd ≥ 0. We have the following corollary.
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Corollary 3.2. Let Φ be the CDF of the normal distribution. For `-distance based attacks, we have
1
2
TVΩ(N (µ1,Σ),N (µ2,Σ)) = 2Φ(∆(ε)/2)− 1 ≤ 2Φ(‖s(ε)‖2/2)− 1, (15)
where µ := µ1 − µ2 ∈ ∈Rm and s(ε) ∈ Rm is defined by sj(ε) := σ−1j (|µ1,j − µ2,j | − ε)+.
Consequently, the Bayes-optimal error R∗Ω is bounded as R
∗
Ω ≥ 1−Φ(∆(ε)/2) ≥ 1−Φ (‖s(ε)‖2/2).
3.3 Computing the optimal attack plan
It turns out that the optimal transport plan γΩ which realizes the distance TVΩ(P 1, P 2) in Theorem
3.2 can be efficiently computed via matching (graph theory), by using iid samples from both distribu-
tions. The following theorem inspired by [Harel and Mannor, 2015], and the proof is similar and
therefore omitted.
Theorem 3.3 (Optimal universal attacks via maximal matching). Suppose P 1 =
∑n1
i=1 µ
1
i δx1i
and P 2 =
∑n2
j=1 µ
2
jδx2j are distributions with finite supports V
1 := {x11, . . . , x1n1} ⊆ X ,
V 2 = {x21, . . . , x2n2} ⊆ X , with weights (µ11, . . . , µ1n1) ∈ ∆n1 , (µ21, . . . , µ2n2) ∈ ∆n2 . Let G =
(V 1, V 2, E) be the bipartite graph defined by (x1i , x
2
j ) ∈ E iff cΩ(x1i , x2j ) = 0. Then we can compute
OTΩ(P
1, P 2) via the following linear program: OTΩ(P 1, P 2) = minw1,w2,γ
∑n1
i=1 w
1
i +
∑n2
j=1 w
2
j
subject to :w1 ∈ Rn1+ , w2 ∈ Rn2+ , γ ∈ Rn1×n2+ γi,j = 0 ∀(i, j) 6∈ E∑
x2j∼x1i
γi,j + w
1
i = µ
1
i ∀i ∈ [[n1]],
∑
x1i∼x2j
γi,j + w
2
j = µ
2
j ∀j ∈ [[n2]].
Moreover, the optimal transport plan γΩ to the above LP, and the can be computed in
O(kmin(n1, n2)
√
max(n1, n2) time, where k is the average number of pairs edges in the graph G.
The corresponding algorithm for computing optimal matching γ is given in Alg. 1 (Appendix).
4 Universal bounds for general distance-based attacks
We now turn to the special case of metric attacks where X = (X , d) is a metric space and the attack
model is Ω = Ωε := {(x, x′) ∈ X 2 | d(x, x′) ≤ ε}. Then, Eq. (5) can be equivalently written as
OTΩε = TVε(P
1, P 2) := inf
(X1,X2)
P(d(X1, X2) > ε), (16)
where the infimum is taken over all couplings (X1, X2) of P 1 and P 2. The joint distribution γε of
(X1, X2) is then an optimal adversarial attack plan for the classification problem (P 1, P 2).
Coincidentally, the metric TVε in (16) has been studied in context of statistical testing, under the name
"perturbed variation" [Harel and Mannor, 2015] as robust replace for usual total-variation. Moreover,
the authors proposed an efficient algorithm for computing both the optimal plan γε as a maximal
graph matching in a bipartite graph, and its value TVε.
In what follows, we will exploit geometric properties of the class-conditional distributions P k to
obtain upper-bounds on TVε(P 1, P 2), which will in turn imply lower lower bounds on optimal error
(thanks to Theorem 3.2.
4.1 Bounds for light-tailed class-conditional distributions
We now establish a series of upper-bounds on TVε(P 1, P 2), which in turn provide hard lower bounds
for the adversarial robustness error on any classifier for the binary classification experiment (P 1, P 2),
namely R∗ε(P
1, P 2). These bounds are a consequence of ligh-tailed class conditional distributions.
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Name of the game. We always have the upper-bound R∗ε(P 1, P 2) ≤ 1/2 (attained by random
guessing). Thus, the real challenge is to show that R∗ε(P
1, P 2) = 1/2 + oε(1), where oε(1)
goes to zero as the attack "budget" ε is increased.
Definition 4.1 (Bounded tails). Let α : [0,∞)→ [0, 1] be a function. We say the a distribution Q on
(X , d) has α-light tail about the point x0 ∈ X if Px∼Q(d(x, x0) > t) ≤ α(t) ∀t ≥ 0.
Theorem 4.1 (The curse of light-tailed class-conditional distributions). Suppose P 1 and P 2 have
α-light tails about a points µ1 ∈ X and µ2 ∈ X resp. Then for every ε ≥ d(µ1, µ2), we have
R∗ε(P
1, P 2) ≥ 1/2− α ((ε− d(µ1, µ2))/2) . (17)
As an example, take X = (Rm, ‖ · ‖∞) and P k = N (µk, σ2Im). Then, one computes
P(d(x, µ1) > t) = P(‖N(0, σ2Im)‖∞ > t) ≤ mP(|N (0, σ2)| > t) ≤ 2me−t2/(2σ2), ∀t ≥ 0.
Thus, we can take α(t) = 2me−
t2
2σ2 ∀t ≥ 0 and obtain that the test error of any classi-
fier under `∞-norm adversarial attacks of size ε is ≥ R∗ε(P 1, P 2) ≥ (1 − TVε(P 1, P 2))/2 ≥
1/2−me(ε−‖µ1−µ2‖∞)2/(4σ2) = 1/2 + o(1), which increases to 1/2, i.e the performance of random
guessing, exponentially fast as ε is increased. This is just another manifestation of the concentration
of measure in high-dimensions (large m), for distributions which are sufficiently “curved”.
4.2 Bounds under general moment and tail contraints on the class-conditional distributions
The following condition will be central for the rest of the manuscript.
Condition 4.1 (Moment constraints). Let α > 0 andM : R+ → R+ be an increasing convex function
(fixed, once an for all) such that M(0) = 0. GM,α will denote the collection of all pairs (P 1, P 2) of
distributions over X such that ∃x0 ∈ X , Ex1∼P 1 [M(d(x1, x0))] + Ex2∼P 2 [M(d(x2, x0))] ≤ 2α.
For example, if each P k is σ-subGaussian about µk ∈ Rm, then we may take M(r) := er2/σ − 1,
x0 = (µ1 + µ2)/2 to satisfy the condition. More generally, recall that the Orlicz M -norm of a
random variable Xk ∼ P k (relative to the reference point x0) is defined by
‖Xk‖M := inf{C > 0 | E[M(d(Xk, x0)/C)] ≤ 1}. (18)
Thus, Condition 4.1 is more general than demanding that both P 1 and P 2 have Orlicz M -norm at
most α about a point x0.
Theorem 4.2 (The curse of bounded moments). Suppose (P 1, P 2) satisfies Condition 4.1. Then
R∗ε(P
1, P 2) ≥ 1/2(1− α/M(ε)), ∀ε ≥ 0. (19)
A variety of corollaries can be obtained by considering different choices for the moment function
M and the parameter α. More are presented in the supplementary materials. For example if P 1
and P 2 have d(·, x0) ∈ Lp(P 1) ∩ Lp(P 2) for some (and therefore all!) x0 ∈ X , we may take
M(r) := rp and α = Wd,p(P 1, P 2)p, where Wd,p(P 1, P 2) is the order-p Wasserstein distance
between P 1 and P 2, and obtain the following corollary. Here, Lp(P k) is the space of measurable
functions g : X → R such that |g|p is P k-integrable. We have
Corollary 4.1 (Lower-bound from Wasserstein distance). Under the conditions in the previous
paragraph, we have R∗ε(P
1, P 2) ≥ 12
(
1−
(
Wd,p(P
1,P 2)
ε
)p)
.
5 Universal bounds for random corruption via information theory
We now analyse what happens when the attacker is replaced with a random noise corruption mech-
anism. For example, think of measurement errors in collected data, or natural dirt on road traffic
signs (this can be problematic for the artificial vision system on board a self-driving car). Robustness
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of classifiers to random perturbations of inputs has been studied as a proxy of their robustness to
adversarial attacks (e.g [Gilmer et al., 2019]). We do not claim that deep learning is vulnerable to
random noise. Of course, certain deep-learning architectures are known to be robust / invariant w.r.t to
certain kinds of noise of transformations [Andén and Mallat, 2014]. One can cite scattering networks
as a prime example. Rather, our goal in this section is to establish quantitative bounds on adversarial
error of any classifier (including deep learning models), as a function of the size of the noise.
We take an information-theoretic point of view and think of the scenario as that of transmitting
information via a noisy communication channel as in Fig. 2. For the analysis, we develop strong Data
Processing Inequalities (DPIs) that bound the transmission rate contractively. Already the basic /
weak DPI, we know that a random noise corruption mechanism would only reduce the total-variation
distance between class-conditional probabilities (making the classification problem harder), and
so increase Bayes-optimal error for the problem. We will provide quantitative problem-specific
lower-bounds which reflect the increase Bayes-optimal error due to the noise corruption.
5.1 Markov kernels as a model for random corruption
Markov kernels play a central role in the differential geometry of very general metric spaces e.g
graphs. For example, see [Ollivier, 2009] for a synthetic theory of ricci curvature, built using Markov
kernels. Markov kernels are a generalization of a Markov chains. Intuitively, given a point x ∈ X ,
the distribution ωx, prescribes how to "jump" from a point x. If Q is a measure on X , then the
probability of starting at a point x ∼ Q, and then landing in a prescribed Borel A ⊆ X is given by
the convolution
(Q ∗ ω)(A) :=
∫
x∈X
ωx(A) dQ(x) =
∫
x∈X
∫
x˜∈A
dωx(x˜) dQ(x). (20)
More formally, a Markov kernel on X is a map ω : X → P(X ), x 7→ ωx such that ωx depends
measurably on x, i.e for every Borel A ⊆ X and every Borel I ⊆ R, the set {x ∈ X | ωx(A) ∈ I}
is a Borel subset of X . ω can be seen as a linear operator acting on distributions according to
20. In particular, note that δx ∗ ω = ωx ∀x ∈ X . The trivial Markov kernel given by set-
ting ωx = δx ∀x ∈ X of course corresponds to classical machine learning with no noise cor-
ruption of the input data. A less trivial example is the isotropic Gaussian Markov kernel (in
a possibly infinite-dimensional Hilbert space), for which ωx ≡ N (x, ε2I) = x + N (0, ε2I).
x h yˆ
N (0, ε2I)
Figure 2: Classification in a
Hilbert space X under corrup-
tion by isotropic Gaussian noise.
Here the Markov kernel is given
by ωx = x+N (0, ε2I), ∀x.
Refer to Fig. 2. For classification problems in finite-dimensional
euclidean space Rm, this would be a model for corruption by
random noise of "size" ε
√
m.
Links with adversarial attacks. It should be noted that our
Markov kernel model of corruption is general enough to encom-
pase even adversarial attacks considered in sections 2, 3, and 4.
Indeed, an attacker a : X → X can be encoded as a Markov kernel
ωa given by ωax := δa(x). Thus, adversarial attacks are special
cases of noise corruption in our framework of Markov kernels.
However, this link is only anecdotal because, for the bounds we
obtain in this section, we require the Markov kernel ω to have
(w.r.t Lebesgue), which is not the case for singular kernels like ωa.
This is not an issue per se, since in section 4 we already obtained
explicit bounds in case of distance-based adversarial attacks.
Definition 5.1 (Misclassification error under random corruption). Consider a binary experiment
P = (P 1, P 2). Given a Markov kernel ω on X , the robust test-error of a classifier h : X → {1, 2}
under corruption by ω is defined by Rω(h;P ) =
∑2
k=1 Ex∼Pk, x˜∼ωx [1[[h(x˜) 6= k]]]. The robust
Bayes-optimal test error under corruption by ω is defined by R∗ω(P
1, P 2) := infh Rω(h;P ).
Lemma 5.1. For any classifier h : X → {1, 2}, we have the identity Rω(h;P ) = R(h;Pω), where
Pω = (P
1 ∗ ω, P 2 ∗ ω). Furthermore, it holds that R∗ω(P 1, P 2) = 12 (1− TV(P 1 ∗ ω, P 2 ∗ ω)).
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5.2 Elementary universal bounds for random corruption
We will need the following notion of regularity of Markov kernels on metric spaces, inspired by
[Polyanskiy and Wu, 2016].
Condition 5.1 (Regularity of Markov kernels). Given a measurable function θ : R+ → [0, 1], a
Markov kernel ω on X is said be θ-regular iff TV(ωx, ωx′) ≤ θ(d(x, x′)), ∀x, x′ ∈ X .
As we shall see, the above condition is a key ingredient for obtaining strong DPIs. As an example,
consider the Gaussian smoothing Markov kernel given by ωx = N (x, ε2Im). By formula (15),
we know that TV(ωx, ωx′) = TV(N (x, ε2I),N (x′, ε2I)) = 2Φ (‖x− x′‖/ε)− 1. So we can take
θ(r) := 2Φ(r/ε)−1 for r ≥ 0, a concave nondecreasing function, and Condition 5.1 will be satisfied.
Theorem 5.1 (Strong DPIs from moment conditions). Let ω be a Markov kernel on X and let
d : X 2 → R+ be a measurable function. Finally, let θ : R+ → [0, 1] be a convex non-decreasing
function such that Condition 5.1 is satisfied. Then, for any strictly-increasing convex function M :
R+ → R+, and for all P 1, P 2 ∈ PM◦d(X ), it holds that TV(P 1 ∗ω, P 2 ∗ω) ≤ θ(WM,d(P 1, P 2)),
where WM,d(P 1, P 2) := M−1 (inf E[M(d(X1, X2))]) and the infimum is taken over all couplings
(X1, X2) of the distributions P 1 and P 2.
Corollary 5.1. LetX , ω, θ be as in Thm. 5.1, with the added condition that d is upper-semicontinuous.
For every P 1, P 2 ∈ Pdp(X ), we have TV(P 1∗ω, P 2∗ω) ≤ θ(Wd,p(P 1, P 2)), whereWd,p(P 1, P 2)
is the p-Wasserstein distance between P 1 and P 2, for the ground cost d.
The above corollary takes us to the right direction: we link the degree of separation distributions
P 1 ∗ ω and P 2 ∗ ω in the smoothed problem, measured in total-variation, to the degree of separation
between the distributions P 1 and P 2 in the original problem, measured in Wasserstein distance.
However, we are still missing a link to the ultimate complexity parameter of the original problem,
namely the total-variation between P 1 and P 2. Such a link is unlikely to be obtainable from the
above corollary as there is in general no nonvacuous inequalities between TV and Wasserstein metrics
(except for extreme cases where the underlying metric space is discrete and bounded).
5.3 Improved universal bounds via total-variational Dobrushin curves
Information theorists know that in general, the TV-based data-processing inequalities are not contrac-
tions. That is, an inequality of the form TV(P 1∗ω, P 2∗ω) ≤ cTV(P 1, P 2) is generally only true for
c = 1. If we could have c < 1, then in view of Theorem 3.2, such a contraction would immediate lead
to universal results of the form: "if ordinary learning on a binary classification problem P = (P 1, P 2)
is hard, then adversarially-robust learning is much harder!". Lack of contraction is really not a problem.
Afterall, all we need are inequalities of the form TV(P 1 ∗ω, P 2 ∗ω) ≤ D(TV(P 1, P 2)), for suitable
functions Dω : [0, 1] → [0, 1] such that D(t) < t. Note that if TV(P 1, P 2) ≤ t, then the Bayes-
optimal error is at least (1− t)/2 in the noiseless regime, and at least R∗ω(P 1, P 2) ≥ 12 (1−Dω(t)),
in the noisy regime we consider here. Thus, upper bounds on Dω(t) immediately induce lower
bounds on bayes-optimal error in the corrupt. regime. A quantity which can play the rule of such a
nonlinear operator Dω is given by the theory of nonlinear strong DPIs developed by Polyanskiy and
co-workers [Polyanskiy and Wu, 2016] will be the inspiration for the work in the rest of this section.
Definition 5.2 (Dobrushin curve). Given a Markov kernel ω on X , its total-variational Dobrushin
curve is the function Dω,M,α : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] defined by
Dω,M,α(t) := sup
(P 1,P 2)
TV(P 1 ∗ ω, P 2 ∗ ω), (21)
where the sup is over all problems (P 1, P 2) such that TV(P 1, P 2) ≤ t and Condition 4.1 is satisfied.
The following theorem is one of our main results. It generalizes the main result of
[Polyanskiy and Wu, 2016], namely Thm. 4 thereof, which was proposed in the context of in-
formation transmission across additive noise channels. Our generalization is two-fold. First we
consider general Markov kernels on general metric spaces, in place of additive noise channels in
some Rm. Second, we work in general abstract metric spaces instead of finite-dimensional euclidean
spaces.
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Theorem 5.2 (Strong DPIs from moment / tail bounds). Let ω be a Markov kernel on X and let
θ : [0,∞) → [0, 1] be a concave non-decreasing function such that Condition 5.1 holds. Define
the function θ¯ : [0,∞)→ [0, 1] by θ¯(r) = min0≤s≤r θ(s) and let θ¯cc be the concave envelope of θ¯.
Then, ∀t ∈ [0, 1], we have: Dω,M,α(t) ≤ tθ¯cc(2M−1(α/t)).
The above theorem gives precise control on the increase in hardness of statistically testing between
P 1 and P 2, as a function of the noise and moment constraints on the P k’s. This has numerous
consequences for supervised machine learning. The following corollary is the most natural one.
Corollary 5.2 (Universal bound under isotropic Gaussian noise). Consider the isotropic Gaussian
kernel ωx = N (x, ε2I) on a (possibly infinite-dim.) euclidean space X . Then, ∀t ∈ [0, 1] we have
inf
(P 1,P 2)
R∗ω(P
1, P 2) ≥ 1
2
(
1− t
(
2Φ
(
M−1(α/t)
ε
)
− 1
))
, (22)
where the inf is over all classification problems for which TV(P 1, P 2) ≤ t and Condition 4.1 holds.
Figure 3: Visualization of Corollary. 5.2. The
diagonal corresponds to the classical noise-
less Bayes-optimal error rate. The differ-
ent colored regions correspond to the pre-
dicted Bayes-optimal error rate under Gaus-
sian isotropic noise ωx = N (x, ε2Im), ∀x ∈
Rm, with ε = 1, under different moment con-
ditions on the class-conditional distributions.
The upper boundaries of the regions corre-
spond to the RHS of inequality (22).
Interpreting the result. Recall, as in the end of
section 2.1, that in classical machine learning (i.e
clean, aka without any noise corruption of the data
distribution), the Bayes-optimal error is exactly 12 (1−
TV(P 1, P 2)). In the noisy case (under random cor-
ruption of the data), Corollary 5.2 gives a quantitative
lower bound on the Bayes-optimal error for classifica-
tion problems of all difficulties, as measured by level
curves the total-variation distance between the class-
conditional distributions TV(P 1, P 2) in the clean
problem. The result is illustrated in Fig. 3.
This result is of the same flavior as the bounds ob-
tained in section 4: given moment / tail conditions on
the class-conditional distribution, we have explicity
lower-bounds on Baye-optimal error for the problem
of testing / classifying data from P 1 and P 2, as a
function of the perturbation budget (e.g the variance
of the noise ε2, in case of Gaussian perturbations
considered in Corollary 5.2). The result is universal
in the sense that it does not depend on the specific
properties of any classifier; it applies uniformly on
all classifiers.
6 Concluding remarks
Our results extend the current theory on the limitations of adversarial robustness in machine learning.
Using techniques from optimal transport theory, we have obtained explicitly variational formulae
and lower-bounds on the Bayes-optimal error classifiers can attain under adversarial attack. These
formulae suggest that instead of doing adversarial training on normal data, practitioners should strive
to do normal training on adversarially augmented data. Going further, in the case of metric attacks, we
have obtained explicit bounds which exploit the high-dimensional geometry of the class-conditional
distribution of the data. These bounds are universal in that the are classifier-independent; they
only depend on the geometric properties of the class-conditional distribution of the data (e.g finite
moments, light-tailness, etc.).
In the case where the perturbations are corruption by random noise, we have used information-theory
techniques to obtain analogous bounds. Our main result in this direction is a strong data-processing
inequality which induces hard limits on the bayes-optimal error in this scenario. See Fig. 3.
Acknowledgements. Thanks to Eugene Belilovsky, Anna Korba, and Arthur Mensch for kindly
proof-reading an earlier version of this work. A special thanks to user L. Chizat on mathoverflow.
net for providing the core arguments for the proof of (12).
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A Proofs of lemmas, propositions, theorems, and corollaries
In this appendix we provide complete proofs for the theorems, corollaries, etc. which were stated
without proof in the manuscript. For clarity, each result from the manuscript (theorems, corollaries,
etc.) is restated in this supplemental before proved.
A.1 Proofs for results in section 3
Proposition 3.1 (Extension of Theorem 1 of [Bhagoji et al., 2019]). For any attack model Ω on the
feature spaceX , the Bayes-optimal error under type-Ω attacks R∗Ω(P 1, P 2) ≥ 12 (1−OTΩ(P 1, P 2)).
First note that the Ω defined is not automatically a closed subset of X 2. A sufficient condition is that
the metric space (X , d) has the mid-point property.
Let us further suppose that
• Ω is symmetric, i.e (x, x′) ∈ Ω iff (x′, x) ∈ Ω, and that
• Ω contains the diagonal of X 2, i.e (x, x) ∈ Ω for all x ∈ X .
Proof of Proposition 3.1. For x ∈ X , define Ω(x) := {x′ ∈ X | (x, x′) ∈ Ω}. For a classifier h,
consider the derived classifier h˜ : X → {1, 2,⊥} defined by
h˜(x) :=
{
y, if h(x′) = y ∀x′ ∈ Ω(x),
⊥, else. (23)
Here, the special symbol ⊥6∈ {1, 2} should be read as “I don’t know!”. Let X1 (resp. X2) be a
random variable that has the same distribution as X conditioned on the event Y = 1 (resp. Y = 2).
One easily computes 1− RΩ(h;P 1, P 2) = 12P(h˜(X1) = 1) + 12P(h˜(X2) = 2), from which
2(1− RΩ(h;P 1, P 2)) = E[1[h˜(X1) = 1]] + E[1[h˜(X2) = 2]]. (24)
Now, define g0(x′) := 1[h˜(x′) = 1] and f0(x) = 1[h˜(x) 6= 2] = 1− 1[h˜(x) = 2]. Then f0 and g0
are bounded, and P 2- (resp. P 1-) a.s continuous. Moreover, given x′, x ∈ X , if cΩ(x′, x) = 1, then
x′ 6∈ Ω(x). Since {h−1({y})}y=1,2 is a partitioning of X , at most one of Ω(x′) ⊆ h−1({1}) and
Ω(x) ⊆ h−1({2}) holds. Thus 1[h˜(x′) = 1] + 1[h˜(x) = 2] ≤ 1, and so
g0(x
′)− f0(x) = 1[h˜(x′) = 1] + 1[h˜(x′) = 2]− 1 ≤ cΩ(x′, x),
and so (f0, g0) is a pair of Kantorovich potentials for the cost function cΩ. Consequently, from the
Kantorovich-Rubinstein duality formula, we have
OTΩ(P 2, P 1) = sup
potentials f,g
E[g(X1)]− E[f(X2)] ≥ E[g0(X1)]− E[f0(X2)]
= E[1[h˜(X1) = 1]] + E[1[h˜(X2) = 2]]2
(24)
= 2(1− RΩ(h;P 1, P 2)) = 1− 2RΩ(h;P 1, P 2).
Since h is an arbitrary classifier, we obtain that 2 inf
h
RΩ(h;P
1, P 2) ≥ 1 − OTΩ(P 2, P 1) as
claimed.
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Theorem 3.1. Let Ω be an attack model on X . Then we have the identity
OTΩ(P
1, P 2) = sup
U⊆X closed
P 1(U)− P 2(UΩ). (10)
In particular, for distance-based attacks we have OTΩε(P
1, P 2) = supU⊆X closed P
2(U)−P 1(Uε).
Proof. One computes
OTΩ(P
1, P 2) := inf
γ∈Π(P 1,P 2)
∫
X 2
cΩ(x, x
′) dγ(x, x′) = inf
γ∈Π(P 1,P 2)
∫
X 2
1[(x, x′) ∈ Ω] dγ(x, x′)
= inf
γ∈Π(P 1,P 2)
∫
Ω
dγ(x, x′) = inf
γ∈Π(P 1,P 2)
γ(Ω),
(25)
On the other hand, by Strassen’s Marriage Theorem (see [Villani, 2003, Theorem 1.27 of]) and the
definition of UΩ in Eq. (8), one has
inf
γ∈Π(P 1,P 2)
γ(Ω) = sup
U⊆X closed
P 2(U)− P 1(UΩ),
and the result follows.
Theorem 3.2 (Bounds via adversarial total-variation). Let Ω be an attack model on the feature space
X . For k = 1, 2, let projk : X 2 → X be the canonical projection operators, i.e proj1(x1, x2) =
x1 = proj
2(x2, x1). Define the functionals
TVΩ(P
1, P 2) := inf
a1,a2 type-Ω
TV(a1#P
2, a2#P
1),
T˜VΩ(P
1, P 2) := inf
γ1,γ2
TV(proj2#γ1, proj
1
#γ2),
(11)
where "#" denotes pushfoward of measures and the 2nd infimum is taken over all pairs of distributions
(γ1, γ2) on X 2 which are concentrated on X 2 \Ω and verify proj1#γ1 = P 2, proj2#γ2 = P 1. Then,
OTΩ(P
1, P 2) = T˜VΩ(P
1, P 2) ≤ TVΩ(P 1, P 2), (12)
and there is equality if P 1 and P 2 have densities w.r.t the Lebesgue measure on X .
Consequently, we have the following lower-bound for the Bayes-optimal error against type-Ω attacks
R∗Ω(P
1, P 2) ≥ 1
2
(1− OTΩ(P 1, P 2)) = 1
2
(1− TVΩ(P 1, P 2)) ≥ 1
2
(1− T˜VΩ(P 1, P 2)). (13)
Proof. Let Ω′ := X 2 \ Ω. To prove the theorem, we consider the following intermediate quantity
E(P 1, P 2) := inf
γ∈Π≤(P 1,P 2), supp(γ)⊆Ω′
1− γ(X 2)
where Π≤ denotes the set of partial transport plans, i.e. probabilities on X 2 with marginals smaller
than P 1 and P 2 respectively. First, let us show that OTΩ = E. Let γ ∈ Π(P 1, P 2) and let γ˜ be its
restriction to Ω′. Then γ˜ is feasible for E and it holds γ(Ω) = 1− γ˜(X 2) so E ≤ OTΩ. Conversely,
let γ be feasible for E and consider any γ˜ ∈ Π(P 1 − proj1# γ, P 2 − proj2# γ). Then γ + γ˜ is feasible
for OTΩ and (γ + γ˜)(Ω) = γ˜(Ω) ≤ γ˜(X 2) = 1− γ(X 2). So, OTΩ ≤ E and thus OTΩ = E.
Let us show now that E = T˜VΩ. Consider the maps Ta, Tb : X 2 → X 2, D : X → X 2 defined by
Ta(x, x
′) = (x, (x+ x′)/2), Tb(x, x′) = ((x+ x′)/2, x′), D(x) = (x, x). (26)
Let γ be feasible for E and consider γa = (Ta)#γ + D#(P 1 − proj1# γ) and γb = (Tb)#γ +
D#(P
2 − proj2# γ). Then (γa, γb) is feasible for d˜ and
TV(proj2# γa, proj
1
# γb) ≤ (P 1 − proj1# γ)(X ) + (P 2 − proj2# γ)(X ) = 2(1− γ(X 2))
because the second marginal of (Ta)#γ and the first marginal of (Tb)#γ agree by construction. Thus
TVΩ ≤ 2E. Conversely, let γa, γb be feasible for T˜VΩ, and let γ˜a ≤ γa and γ˜b ≤ γb be such
that proj2# γ˜a = proj
1
# γb = (proj
2
# γa) ∧ (proj1# γb) where ∧ is the "pointwise" minimum of two
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measures (they can be built with the disintegration theorem). Now build γ˜ feasible for E by gluing
together γ˜a and γ˜b, see [1, Lem. 5.5]. It holds
TV(proj2# γa, proj
1
# γb) = 2(1− proj2# γa ∧ proj1# γb)(X ) = 2(1− γ˜(X 2)).
Thus 2E ≤ T˜VΩ hence 2E = T˜VΩ.
Now, the fact that T˜VΩ ≤ TVΩ in general is due to the fact to any transport map a satisfying
‖a(x)− x‖ ≤ ε corresponds a deterministic transport plan (id, a)#P 1 supported on Dε. In general,
equality in the theorem will fail to hold. For example, on the real line, P 1 = 13δ−2ε +
1
3δ0 +
1
3δ2ε
and P 2 = 12δ−ε +
1
2δε has TVΩ(P
1, P 2) = 2/6 and T˜VΩ(P 1, P 2) = 0.
Finally, the fact that T˜VΩ = TVΩ when P 1 and P 2 are absolutely continuous is a consequence of
the existence of an optimal transport map for the W∞ distance, see [1, Thm. 3.24]. Indeed, if (γa, γb)
is feasible for T˜VΩ, then W∞(P 1, proj2# γa) ≤ ε and there exists a measurable map a1 : X → X
such that ‖a1(x)− x‖ ≤ ε P 1-a.e. and (a1)#P 1 = proj2# γa (one can build a2 similarly).
A crude universal bound for normed vector-spaces. Now consider the special case where X =
(X , ‖ · ‖), a normed-vector space. Given a distribution P1 on X and a point z ∈ X , let P1 + z be
the translation of P1 by z. Alternatively, if X is a random variable with distribution P1, then P1 + z
corresponds to the distribution of the r.v P1 + z. For z, z′ ∈ BallX (0; ε), consider the type-Ω attacks
az,z
′
1 , a
z,z′
2 : X → X defined by az,z
′
1 (x) = x− z and az,z
′
2 (x) = x+ z
′. One computes
TVΩ(P
1, P 2) := inf
a1,a2∈A
TV(a1#P
1, a2#P
2) ≤ inf
‖z‖X≤ε, ‖z′‖X≤ε
TV(az,z
′
1 #P
2, az,z
′
2 #P
1)
= inf
‖z‖X≤ε, ‖z′‖X≤ε
TV(P 1 − z, P 2 + z′) ≤ inf
‖z‖X≤ε
TV(P 1 − z, P 2 + z),
where P 2 + z is the translation of distribution P 2 by the vector z. Note that in the above upper
bound, the LHS can be made very concrete in case the distributions are prototypical (e.g multivariate
Gaussians with same covariance matrix;etc.). Thus we have the the following result
Corollary 3.1. Let the feature space X be a normed vector space and consider a distance-limited
attack model Ωx = Ball(x; ε). Then, it holds that:
R∗Ω(P
1, P 2) ≥ 1
2
(
1− sup
z∈Ball(0;ε)
TV(P 1 − z, P 2 + z)
)
. (14)
Proof. For every z ∈ X , since {U − z | U ⊆ X closed} = {U | U ⊆ X closed}, we may translate
all the closed sets U in formula established in Theorem 3.1 by z without changing the value of the
expression. Thus,
OTΩ(P
1, P 2) = sup
U⊆X closed
P 1(U − z)− P 2((U − z)2ε).
On the other hand, observe that U − z′ ⊆ (U − z)2ε whenever ‖z − z′‖X ≤ 2ε. Indeed,
x = u− z′ ∈ U − z′ =⇒ d(x, U − z) = d(u, U − z + z′) ≤ d(u, u− z + z′) = ‖z − z′‖X ≤ 2ε.
Thus, P 1(U−z)−P 2((U−z)2ε) ≤ P 1(U−z)−P 2(U+z′) ∀ closed U ⊆ X and ‖z−z′‖X ≤ 2ε,
and so optimizing over z and z′, one has
OTΩ(P
1, P 2) ≤ inf
‖z′−z‖X≤2ε
sup
U⊆X closed
P 1(U − z)− P 2(U − z′)
= inf
‖z′−z‖X≤2ε
TV(P 1 − z, P 2 − z′) =: c1
≤ inf
‖z‖X≤ε, ‖z′‖X≤ε
TV(P 1 + z, P 2 + z′) =: c2 ≤ min(c3, c4),
where in the last two inequalities we have used the definition of c3 and c4 and the elementary fact that
((z′ = −z and ‖z‖X ≤ ε) or (z′ = 0 and ‖z‖X ≤ ε)) =⇒ max(‖z‖X , ‖z′‖X ≤ ε) =⇒ ‖z′ − z‖X ≤ 2ε.
Plugging the above inequalities in universal bound in Theorem 3.1 then yields the claim.
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Corollary 3.2. Let Φ be the CDF of the normal distribution. For `-distance based attacks, we have
1
2
TVΩ(N (µ1,Σ),N (µ2,Σ)) = 2Φ(∆(ε)/2)− 1 ≤ 2Φ(‖s(ε)‖2/2)− 1, (15)
where µ := µ1 − µ2 ∈ ∈Rm and s(ε) ∈ Rm is defined by sj(ε) := σ−1j (|µ1,j − µ2,j | − ε)+.
Proof. The first part of the claim follows from a direct application of Theorem abc of [?]:
TV(N (µ1,Σ),N (µ2,Σ)) = 2Φ(‖µ‖Σ2/2)2,
where µ := µ1 − µ1 ∈ Rd. Thus R∗Ω ≥ 1 − Φ(∆(ε)/2), where ∆(ε) := min‖z‖X≤ε ‖z − µ‖Σ2 .
It now remains to bound Φ(∆(ε)), and we are led to consider the computation of quantities of the
following form.
Bounding the quantity ∆(ε). We are led to consider problems of the form
α := max‖w‖Σ≤1 w
Ta− ε‖w‖1, (27)
where a ∈ Rd and Σ be a positive definite matrix of size d. Of course, the solution value might not
be analytically expressible in general, but there is some hope, when the matrix Σ is diagonal. That
notwithstanding, using the dual representation of the `1-norm, one has
α = max
‖w‖Σ≤1
min
‖z‖∞≤ε
wTa− wT z = max
‖z‖∞≤ε
min
‖w‖Σ≤1
wT (z − a)
= min
‖z‖∞≤ε
(
max
‖w‖Σ≤1
wT (z − a)
)
= min
‖z‖∞≤ε
(
max
‖w˜‖2≤1
w˜TΣ−1(z − a)
)
= min
‖z‖∞≤ε
‖z − a‖Σ−1 = min‖z‖∞≤ε ‖z − a‖Σ−1 ,
(28)
where we have used Sion’s minimax theorem to interchange min and max in the first line, and we
have introduced the auxiliary variable w˜ := Σ−1/2w in the fourth line. We note that given a value for
the dual variable z, the optimal value of the primal variable w is
w ∝ Σ
−1(a− z)
‖Σ−1(a− z)‖2 . (29)
The above expression (28) for the optimal objective value α is unlikely to be computable analytically
in general, due to the non-separability of the objective (even though the constraint is perfectly
separable as a product of 1D constraints). In any case, it follows from the above display that α ≤ 0,
with equality iff ‖a‖∞ ≤ ε.
Exact formula for diagonal Σ. In the special case where Σ = diag(σ1, . . . , σ2), the square of the
optimal objective value α2 can be separated as
α ≥ 0, α2 =
d∑
j=1
min
|zj |≤ε
σ−2j (zj − aj)2 =
d∑
j=1
σ−2j

(aj + ε)
2, if aj ≤ −ε,
0, if − ε < aj ≤ ε,
(aj − ε)2, if aj > ε,
=
d∑
j=1
σ−2j ((|aj | − ε)+)2.
Thus α =
√∑d
j=1 σ
−2
j ((|aj | − ε)+)2. By the way, the optimium is attained at
zj =

−ε, if aj ≤ −ε,
aj , if − ε < aj ≤ ε,
ε, if aj > ε,
= aj − sign(aj)(|aj | − ε)+
(30)
Plugging this into (29) yields the optimal weights
wj ∝ σ−2j sign(aj)(|aj | − ε)+. (31)
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Upper / lower bounds for general Σ. Let σ1, σ2, . . . , σd > 0 be the eigenvalues of Σ. Then
‖z − a‖2Σ−1 := (z − a)TΣ−1(w − a) ≤
d∑
j=1
(zj − aj)2/σ2j =: ‖z − a‖2diag(1/σ1,...,1/σd).
Therefore in view of the previous computations for diagonal covariance matrices, one has the bound
α ≤
√∑d
j=1 σ
−2
j ((|aj | − εj)+)2.
A.2 Proofs for results in section 4
Theorem 4.1 (The curse of light-tailed class-conditional distributions). Suppose P 1 and P 2 have
α-light tails about a points µ1 ∈ X and µ2 ∈ X resp. Then for every ε ≥ d(µ1, µ2), we have
R∗ε(P
1, P 2) ≥ 1/2− α ((ε− d(µ1, µ2))/2) . (17)
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Define ε˜ := (ε − d(m1,m2))/2 and let (X1, X2) be a any coupling of P 1
and P 2. By definition of TVε(P 1, P 2), we have
TVε(P
1, P 2) ≤ P(d(X1, X2) > ε) ≤ P(d(X1,m1) + d(X2,m2) > ε− d(m1,m2))
≤ P (d(X1,m1) > ε˜) + P (d(X2,m2) > ε˜)
≤ α(ε˜) + α(ε˜) = 2α(ε˜),
where the 1st inequality is the triangle inequality and the 2nd is a union bound.
Theorem 4.2 (The curse of bounded moments). Suppose (P 1, P 2) satisfies Condition 4.1. Then
R∗ε(P
1, P 2) ≥ 1/2(1− α/M(ε)), ∀ε ≥ 0. (19)
Proof. Let (X1, X2) be a coupling of P 1 and P 2. Then, by the definition of TVε(P 1, P 2), we have
TVε(P
1, P 2) ≤ P(d(X1, X2) > ε) ≤ P ((d(X1, x0) + d(X2, x0))/2 > ε)
≤ P (M ((d(X1, x0) + d(X2, x0))/2) > M(ε))
≤ P ((M(d(X1, x0)) +M(d(X2, x0)))/2 > M(ε)) ≤ α/M(ε),
where the 2nd inequality is the triangle inequality; the 3rd inequality is because M is increasing; the
4th is because M is convex; the 5th is Markov’s inequality and the moment the assumption.
Corollary 4.1 (Lower-bound from Wasserstein distance). Under the conditions in the previous
paragraph, we have R∗ε(P
1, P 2) ≥ 12
(
1−
(
Wd,p(P
1,P 2)
ε
)p)
.
Proof. Follows from Theorem 4.2 with M(r) ≡ rp and α = Wd,p(P 1, P 2)p.
A.3 Proofs for results in section 5
Lemma 5.1. For any classifier h : X → {1, 2}, we have the identity Rω(h;P ) = R(h;Pω), where
Pω = (P
1 ∗ ω, P 2 ∗ ω). Furthermore, it holds that R∗ω(P 1, P 2) = 12 (1− TV(P 1 ∗ ω, P 2 ∗ ω)).
Proof. We prove a more general result for any loss function ` : R × [[K]] → R. Let, `h(x, y) :=
`(h(x), y). Recall the definition of the sub-probability measures P y on X for y ∈ [[K]]. Now, by
direct computation, we have
Rω(h;P ; `) :=
∑
y
Ex∼Py [Ex˜∼ωx [`h(x˜, y)]] =
∑
y
Ex∼(Py∗ω)[`h(x˜, y)] =: R(`h;P 1 ∗ ω, P 2 ∗ ω),
which proves the first identity. The result is then a simple consequence of the classical fact that
R(Q1, Q2) = 12 (1− TV(Q1, Q2)), applied to the classification problem (Q1, Q2) = (P 1 ∗ ω, P 2 ∗
ω).
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Theorem 5.1 (Strong DPIs from moment conditions). Let ω be a Markov kernel on X and let
d : X 2 → R+ be a measurable function. Finally, let θ : R+ → [0, 1] be a convex non-decreasing
function such that Condition 5.1 is satisfied. Then, for any strictly-increasing convex function M :
R+ → R+, and for all P 1, P 2 ∈ PM◦d(X ), it holds that TV(P 1 ∗ω, P 2 ∗ω) ≤ θ(WM,d(P 1, P 2)),
where WM,d(P 1, P 2) := M−1 (inf E[M(d(X1, X2))]) and the infimum is taken over all couplings
(X1, X2) of the distributions P 1 and P 2.
Proof. Take M(r) := rp for all r ≥ 0 and invoke Theorem 5.1, and note that WM,d = Wp,d, the
p-Wasserstein distance between P 1 and P 2, for the ground cost d. This is actually a distance since d
is lower-semicontinuous.
Theorem 5.2 (Strong DPIs from moment / tail bounds). Let ω be a Markov kernel on X and let
θ : [0,∞) → [0, 1] be a concave non-decreasing function such that Condition 5.1 holds. Define
the function θ¯ : [0,∞)→ [0, 1] by θ¯(r) = min0≤s≤r θ(s) and let θ¯cc be the concave envelope of θ¯.
Then, ∀t ∈ [0, 1], we have: Dω,M,α(t) ≤ tθ¯cc(2M−1(α/t)).
Proof. The proof is an adaptation of the prove of [Polyanskiy and Wu, 2016]. Let t ∈ (0, 1] and
(P 1, P 2) ∈ GM,α with TV(P 1, P 2) ≤ t, and let (X1, X2) be a coupling of P 1 and P 2. Then
TV(P 1 ∗ ω, P 2 ∗ ω) = P(X1 6= X2)TV(P 1 ∗ ω, P 2 ∗ ω | X1 6= X2)
≤ P(X1 6= X2)θ¯cc(E[d(X,X ′)|X1 6= X2]).
(32)
On the other hand, one computes
M
(
E
[
d(X1, X2)
2
∣∣∣X1 6= X2]) (a)≤ E [M (d(X1, X2)
2
∣∣∣X 6= X ′)]
(b)
=
1
P(X1 6= X2)E
[
M
(
d(X1, X2)
2
)]
(c)
≤ 1
P(X1 6= X2)E
[
M
(
d(X1, x0) + d(X2, x0)
2
)]
(d)
≤ 1
P(X1 6= X2)E
[
M
(
d(X1, x0)
2
)
+M
(
d(X2, x0)
2
)]
=
1
P(X1 6= X2)
(
E
[
M
(
d(X1, x0)
2
)]
+ E
[
M
(
d(X2, x0)
2
)])
(e)
≤ α/2 + α/2
P(X1 6= X2) =
α
P(X1 6= X2) ,
where (a) is Jensen’s inequality; (b) is Bayes rule and the fact that M(0) = 0; (c) is by the triangle
inequality; (d) is by convexity of M and (e) is because (P 1, P 2) ∈ GM,α. Applying M−1 on both
sides of the above equation then yields
E
[
d(X1, X2)
2
∣∣∣X1 6= X2] = 2M−1( αP(X1 6= X2)
)
. (33)
Combining with (32) yields
TV(P 1 ∗ ω, P 2 ∗ ω) ≤ P(X1 6= X2)θ¯cc
(
2M−1
(
α
P(X1 6= X2)
))
. (34)
But the function u 7→ uθ¯cc(2M−1(α/u)) is non-decreasing on (0, 1]. Thus, optimizing over the
coupling (X1, X2), and using the Strassen "marriage" characterization of total-variation, namely
TV(P 1, P 2) = inf
(X1,X2)
P(X1 6= X2),
we get the inequalities
TV(P 1 ∗ ω, P 2 ∗ ω) ≤ TV(P 1, P 2)θ˜cc
(
2M−1
(
α
TV(P 1, P 2)
))
≤ tθ˜cc(2M−1(α/t)), (35)
where the last inequality is because TV(P 1, P 2) ≤ t by hypothesis. Since (P 1, P 2) ∈ GM,α was
chosen arbitrarily, we conclude that
Dω,M,α(t) ≤ tθ¯cc(2M−1(α/t)) (36)
as claimed.
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The lower bound. We now prove that if Condition 5.1 is an equality, then the bound in (36) is tight
in the sense that
Dω,M,α(t) ≥ tθ¯(2M−1(α/t)). (37)
Indeed, for arbitrary x1, x2 ∈ X such d(x1, x2) ≤ M−1(α/t), consider the pair of distributions
(P 1, P 2) defined by P y = (1 − t)δx0 + tδxy . It is clear that (P 1, P 2) ∈ Gα (because of the
condition d(x1, x2) ≤ M−1(α/t) and the triangle inequality). Moreover, it is easy to compute
TV(P 1, P 2) = t and TV(P 1 ∗ ω, P 2 ∗ ω) = TV((1 − t)ωx0 + tωx1 , (1 − t)ωx0 + tωx2) =
tTV(ωx1 , ωx2) = tθ(d(x1, x2)). Optimizing over (x1, x2), we get (37).
Recall that in classical machine learning (i.e without any noise corruption), the Bayes-optimal error is
exact 12 (1− TV(P 1, P 2)). In the noisy case (random corruption), the next result, namely Corollary
5.2, gives a quantitative lower bound on noisy Bayes-optimal error for classification problems of all
difficulties, as measured by level curves the total-variation distance between the class-conditional
distributions TV(P 1, P 2). The result is illustrated in Fig. 3.
Corollary 5.2 (Universal bound under isotropic Gaussian noise). Consider the isotropic Gaussian
kernel ωx = N (x, ε2I) on a (possibly infinite-dim.) euclidean space X . Then, ∀t ∈ [0, 1] we have
inf
(P 1,P 2)
R∗ω(P
1, P 2) ≥ 1
2
(
1− t
(
2Φ
(
M−1(α/t)
ε
)
− 1
))
, (22)
where the inf is over all classification problems for which TV(P 1, P 2) ≤ t and Condition 4.1 holds.
Proof of Corollary 5.2. Gaussian smoothing Markov kernel given by ωx = N (x, ε2Im). By formula
(15), we know that TV(ωx, ωx′) = TV(N (x, ε2I),N (x′, ε2I)) = 2Φ (‖x− x′‖/ε)− 1. Thus, we
may take θ¯cc(r) = θ¯(r) = θ(r) = 2Φ(r/ε)− 1 ∀r ≥ 0 in Thm. 5.2 to get
D(t) ≤ t
(
2Φ
(
M−1(α/t)
ε
)
− 1
)
,
for all classification problems (P 1, P 2) such that TV(P 1, P 2) ≤ t and Condition 4.1 is satisfied.
Thus, by Lemma 5.1 we get
inf
(P 1,P 2)
R∗ω(P
1, P 2) ≥ 1
2
(1−D(t)) ≥ inf
(P 1,P 2)
1
2
(
1− t
(
2Φ
(
M−1(α/t)
ε
)
− 1
))
,
where the infimum is over all classification problems (P 1, P 2) such that TV(P 1, P 2) ≤ t and
Condition 4.1 is satisfied.
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B Miscellaneous
B.1 Computing optimal adversarial attack plan via bipartite graph matching (section 3.3
Algorithm 1 Fast approximation of TVε(P 1, P 2)
Input: S1 = {x11, . . . , x1n1}, S2 = {x21, . . . , x2n2}, with x11, . . . , x1n1 ∼ P 1 and x21, . . . , x2n2 ∼ P 2.
Define: G = Bipartite(S1, S2, E), where (x1i , x2j ) ∈ E iff d(x1i , x2j ) ≤ 2ε.
Compute: maximal matching on G
Return: 12 (
u1
n1
+ u2n2 ), where u1 (resp. u2) is the number of unmatched vertices in S
1 (resp. S2).
Figure 4: Left: Numerical computation of TVε(P 1, P 2) for two 10-dimensional Gaussians P 1 and
P 2 of same covariance matrix σI10 but different means. The maximal graph matching approach is
described in Alg. 1, run on empirical samples from 500 iid sampes from P 1 and P 2. The analytic
curve is computed via formula (15).
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